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Abstract: 
We study the responses of residential property and equity prices, inflation and economic 
activity to monetary policy shocks in 17 countries, using data spanning 1986-2006, using 
single-country VARs and panel VARs in which we distinguish between groups of countries 
depending on their financial systems. The effect of monetary policy on property prices is 
about three times as large as its impact on GDP. Using monetary policy to guard against 
financial instability by offsetting asset-price movements thus has sizable effects on economic 
activity. While the financial structure influences the impact of policy on asset prices, its 
importance appears limited.  
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 1. Introduction 
There is much agreement that asset prices, in particular residential property prices, provide a 
crucial link through which adverse macroeconomic developments can cause financial 
instability.1 Episodes of asset price booms are seen by many as raising the risk of a future 
sharp “correction” of prices, which could have immediate repercussions on the stability of 
financial institutions. Indeed, many observers have argued that property-price collapses 
have historically played an important role in episodes of financial instability at the level of 
individual financial institutions and the macro economy (e.g. Ahearne et al. 2005, Goodhart 
and Hofmann 2007). 
Not surprisingly, this view has led to calls for central banks to react to movements in asset 
prices “over and beyond” what such changes imply for the path of aggregate demand and 
inflation (Borio and Lowe 2002, Cecchetti et al. 2000).  Proponents of such a policy emphasise 
that episodes of financial instability risk depressing inflation and economic activity below 
their desired levels. Consequently, they argue, central banks that seek to stabilise the 
economy over a sufficiently long time horizon may need to react to current asset-price 
movements (Bean 2004, Ahearne et al. 2005). Importantly, this idea does not mean that asset 
prices should be targeted, only that central banks should be willing to tighten policy at the 
margin in order to slow down increases in asset prices that are viewed as being excessively 
rapid in order to reduce the likelihood of a future crash that could trigger financial instability 
and adverse macroeconomic outcomes. 
While seemingly attractive, this proposed policy assumes that central banks are able to 
identify in real time whether asset prices are moving too fast or are out of line with 
fundamentals. Of course, it is by no means clear that they are better able to judge the 
appropriate level of asset prices and the risk of future sharp price declines than agents 
transacting in these markets.  
Furthermore, the policy has implications for the speed by, and the extent to which, monetary 
policy impacts on the economy (Bean 2004, Bernanke 2002, Kohn 2006). First, changes in 
                                                 
1   The chapters in Hunter et al. (2003) provide an overview of the interlinkages between monetary 
policy, asset prices and financial stability.  
  1policy-controlled interest rates must have stable and predictable effects on asset prices. 
Second, the effects of monetary policy on different asset prices, such as residential-property 
and equity prices, must be about as rapid, since stabilising one may otherwise lead to greater 
volatility of the other. Needless to say, if these criteria are not satisfied simultaneously, any 
attempts by central banks to offset asset-price movements may simply raise macroeconomic 
volatility, potentially increasing the risk of financial instability developing. Third, the size of 
interest rate movements required to mitigate asset price swings must not be so large as to 
cause economic activity and, in particular, inflation to deviate substantially from their 
desired levels since, if this were to be the case, the resulting macroeconomic cycles could lead 
the public to question the central bank’s commitment to price stability. Fourth, the effects of 
monetary policy on asset prices must be felt sufficiently rapidly so that a tightening of policy 
impacts on asset prices before any bubble would burst on its own (since policy should 
otherwise presumably be relaxed to offset the macro economic effects of the collapse of the 
bubble).2 
Unfortunately, however, it is unclear whether monetary policy has predictable effects on 
asset prices and, if so, whether these effects occur at about the same time horizons for 
different asset prices, whether they are large relative to the effects of monetary policy on 
inflation and economic activity and whether they occur faster. While the “over and beyond” 
approach to monetary policy and asset prices is seemingly attractive, further work on the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy and the role of asset prices is thus warranted. 
Instead of testing a specific theoretical proposition, we follow the research strategy of 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) which takes a VAR approach that uses minimal identifying 
assumption to study the relationship between monetary policy and asset prices. One 
attractive feature of this work is that it looks at a broad cross section of countries which 
experienced asset price movements of varying severity and at varying points in time.3 This 
avoids the bias that comes from looking largely or mainly at countries that have undergone 
particularly pronounced asset-price cycles.  
                                                 
2   Bean (2004) and Kohn (2006) discuss the implications of transmission lags for the use of monetary 
policy in the face of asset price bubbles. 
3   See also Goodhart and Hofmann (2007). 
  2In this paper we attempt to shed light on the impact of monetary policy on residential-
property and equity prices, inflation and output growth to monetary policy shocks for a 
panel of 17 OECD countries using quarterly data for the period 1986-2006.4 The analysis 
proceeds in three steps. Following Iacoviello (2002) and Giuliodori (2005), we first study the 
impact of monetary policy on the economy by fitting vector autoregressive models (VARs) 
for individual countries.5 Not surprisingly, the resulting estimates are imprecise, leaving 
considerable uncertainty about the quantitative effect of changes in interest rates on asset 
prices relative to their impact on economic activity and inflation, as would seem to be an 
important precondition for monetary policy to be used to mitigate asset price movements. To 
raise the precision of the estimates, we thus follow Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) and 
estimate a panel VAR (PVAR) incorporating real residential-property and real equity prices. 
Our results show that while monetary policy does have important effects on asset prices, 
those effects are not particularly large relative to those it has on inflation and output. This 
suggests that attempts to stabilise asset prices by using interest rate policy are likely to 
induce pronounced macroeconomic fluctuations. 
However, while the panel estimates confirm that monetary policy has predictable effects on 
residential-property prices, by construction these estimates disregard all country-specific 
information. This is problematic because a number of authors have asserted that the 
transmission mechanism of monetary policy depends on the institutional characteristics of 
the financial system.6 In order to study the importance of institutional factors, we go on to 
split the sample of countries into two groups depending on their financial structure. We then 
estimate a panel VAR for each group and explore whether the impact of monetary policy on 
                                                 
4   Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) also study 17 countries, but use a somewhat longer sample which 
starts in 1973 and also investigate the importance of money and credit for asset prices. Moreover, 
they seek to distinguish between boom and non-boom periods. However, they estimate their panel 
VAR using the standard fixed-effect panel estimator which is likely to yield biased results for 
reasons we discuss below.  
5    Sutton (2002) and Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) also estimate VARs incorporating residential 
property prices for a range of countries. The focus of their studies, however, is on which factors 
explain movements in residential property prices and not on whether monetary policy can be used 
to stabilize asset price movements. 
6   The importance of financial structure of the economy is emphasized by so many authors that it is 
impossible to provide a full overview here. See, among others, Maclennan et al. (1998), Giuliodori 
(2005), Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004), CGFS (2006) and Calza et al. (2007).  
  3asset prices, inflation and output differs between the two groups. We use several measures 
proposed in the literature to capture differences in financial structure, including the 
importance of floating rate lending; whether mortgage equity withdrawal is possible; the 
loan-to-value ratio for new mortgages; the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio in the economy; the 
method used to value property; whether mortgages are securitised; and the share of owner 
occupied dwellings. Since the notion of a financial system is a multi-faceted concept and 
these measures each only capture one aspect, it is possible that they lead to an underestimate 
of the importance of institutional factors. We therefore end the study by using the mortgage 
market index recently proposed by the IMF (2008) to capture the joint impact of financial 
market characteristics on the monetary transmission mechanism. To preview briefly the 
results, we find that the financial structure does condition the responses of asset prices to 
monetary policy but also that the differences between country groups are less important than 
perhaps commonly thought.7 
The paper is organised as follows. The next section contains a discussion of the data and 
Section 3 presents the results for the VARs estimated for individual countries. In Section 4 
we first briefly discuss panel VARs before discussing the estimates. Section 5 focuses on the 
importance of financial structure and provides panel-VAR estimates when the countries are 
divided into two groups on the basis of financial structure. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
2. Data 
The econometric analysis below is conducted on quarterly data on equity and residential 
property prices, consumer price indices (CPIs), real gross domestic product (GDP) and 
interest rates.8 Much of the interest in the behaviour and determination of asset prices stems 
from their role in episodes of financial instability. Since there is a natural tendency to focus 
on data from countries that have experienced pronounced asset-price swings, there is a risk 
of sample selection bias which can be mitigated by using data from a broad cross-section of 
countries. We therefore study 17 countries for which we could obtain both equity and 
residential property price data: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
                                                 
7   See Maclennan et al. (1998) for a dissenting opinion. 
8   All results are obtained with the software RATS 7.0. 
  4Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the 
UK and the US.  
The sample starts in 1986 in order to avoid the more turbulent, higher inflation period that 
ended in the first half of the 1980. Moreover, and as noted by Ahearne et al. (2005) and 
Girouard and Blöndal (2001), many countries deregulated their mortgage markets during the 
early to mid-1980s, suggesting that estimates relying on older data are unlikely to be 
representative for modern economies. The data set ends in 2006. Goodhart and Hofmann 
(2008) in their panel VAR analysis also study, as a part of their robustness analysis, a sub-
sample spanning these years and find that this later period indeed differs from the earlier 
part of their sample (although their data definitions are somewhat different). 
Residential property prices are from the data base of the Bank for International Settlements 
(BIS). Quarterly data over the whole sample period are available for Australia, Canada, 
Switzerland, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the US. 9 For 
Belgium we link an older series for small and medium-sized houses to the residential 
property price series for all dwellings from 1988 on. For Spain we link the residential 
property prices of existing dwellings with those of owner-occupied homes in 2005. For 
Ireland and Norway we interpolate annual data with the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure, using 
a rent index and an index of residential construction cost as reference series, and link the 
resulting series to the BIS quarterly data that start in 1988 and 1991, respectively.10 The same 
interpolation procedure is applied to annual property price data for Germany and Italy.11 For 
Japan the semi-annual series on residential land prices is interpolated.12   
Figure 1 shows the resulting residential property price series. 13  Interestingly, many 
economies experienced a sharp rise in residential property prices in the second half of the 
                                                 
9   For Australia, missing values for the first two quarters of 1986 were generated using the growth of 
residential construction cost. 
10   Annual data for Norway are from Eitrheim and Erlandsen (2004). 
11   Annual property price data for Italy are taken from Cannari et al. (2006). 
12   In Japan, a market for old homes practically does not exist as houses are normally torn down after 
a few decades. As a consequence, land prices determine the value of housing, see the Economist 
(2008). 
13   We note that despite the difference in data sources, the patterns are comparable to those reported 
in Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) and Ahearne et al. (2005). 
  51980s, in many cases associated with liberalisation and deregulation of the housing finance 
sector. Residential property prices were subsequently weak or fell in the 1990s, following the 
US recession in 1990-1991 and the episode of high interest rates in many European countries 
after the turmoil in the European exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in 1992-93 which was 
triggered by the adoption of tight monetary policy in Germany to offset the aggregate 
demand effects of German Reunification. 
The figure indicates that following the collapse of the “bubble economy” in Japan around 
1990, residential property prices fell continuously until the end of the sample. In Germany 
residential property prices started falling in 1994 and declined until 2006, vividly indicating 
the depth of the “German crisis.”  
Before proceeding, it should be emphasised that data on residential property prices are not 
necessarily comparable across countries. The main differences concern the type of housing 
that is included (single family houses, flats or all types), whether existing dwellings or new 
dwellings are considered, whether prices are per dwelling or per square meter, and the 
region (urban, non-urban or both) where the data is collected. While price developments 
vary between types of housing reflecting supply and demand conditions in different market 
segments, the most noticeable differences arise with respect to the area where the data come 
from. Property price booms generally occur in metropolitan areas, and are often less 
pronounced if data for the whole country are considered. The impact of this, however, is 
difficult to assess since only few countries have series covering these different categories. As 
an example, Figure 2 shows the annual increase in nominal UK residential property prices 
for the whole country and the greater London area. While the prices in the latter area seem 
more volatile, the two series evolve in much the same way over time (their correlation is 
0.82). The right-hand panel shows the annual increase in prices for single-family houses and 
flats in Switzerland. Again, the year-to-year changes differ somewhat but generally convey 
the same information (the correlation is 0.86). For our study we use whenever possible the 
broadest residential property price index available in order not to capture regional booms. 
Nevertheless, great care needs to be exercised when comparing property-price developments 
across countries.  
  6Turning to the sources of the other data, the CPI (all items) and share price indices (all 
shares) are from the OECD Main Economic Indicators (MEI) data base. Real GDP data were 
taken from the BIS data base and supplemented with data from the International Financial 
Statistics (IFS) data base of the IMF. 14 For Ireland annual GDP data before 1997 were 
interpolated with the Chow-Lin (1971) procedure using industrial production as the 
reference series. We use a three-month interbank rate for Denmark, Switzerland, Spain, 
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK, a three-
month Treasury bill rate for Belgium, Sweden and the US, and a three-month commercial 
paper rate for Australia, Canada and Japan.15 All interest rates are from the OECD's MEI. For 
Finland and Denmark missing data for 1986 were replaced with data from the IFS (call 
money rate). For the euro-area countries we use the three-month EURIBOR rate after 1998. 
Except for interest rates and equity prices all data are seasonally adjusted.  
3. VARs for individual economies 
We start by estimating VAR models for individual countries, following the approach taken 
by Giuliodori (2005), Iacoviello (2002) and Neri (2004). We include five variables: the CPI (p), 
real GDP (y), the three-month interest rate (i), real residential property prices (rpp) and real 
stock prices (rsp), with the real variables being obtained using the CPI. Except for the interest 
rate, all variables are in logarithms. Before we turn to the econometric analysis it is useful to 
investigate the time-series characteristics of the data. Since we take a panel approach below, 
we perform panel unit root tests, using the test statistics suggested by Pedroni (1999).16 The 
results in Table 1 indicate that all variables are nonstationary in levels, but stationary in first 
differences.  
                                                 
14   For the Netherlands the IFS data apparently contain an error in 1998. We therefore used real GDP 
from the MEI data base. 
15  To eliminate a large spike during the ERM crisis we regressed the three-month interest rate for 
Ireland on a dummy, which is unity in 1992Q4 and zero elsewhere, and used the fitted value in the 
analysis.  
16  We also studied the time series properties of the data for the individual countries, which were 
generally compatible with the panel results discussed in the main text. However, given the sheer 
amount of test results, we refrain from commenting on them.  
  7Next we test for cointegration between the variables.17 When using a common lag length of 
four (which is sufficient to eliminate any seasonal pattern in the residuals for quarterly data) 
for all countries, the existence of at least one cointegrating vector could not be rejected except 
in Japan, Sweden and the US. When using fewer lags, however, also for these countries the 
existence of cointegration could not be rejected. We therefore specify the VAR models in the 
level of the variables. Nevertheless, we neither impose the number of cointegrating relations 
on the systems nor do we attempt to impose overidentifying restrictions on the cointegrating 
vector.  
For an individual country n, n = 1, … , N, the reduced form of the VAR thus can be written as 
t n t n n n t n Y L A Y , , , ) ( ε μ + + = , where  , μn is a constant, An(L) is 
a matrix polynomial in the lag operator and 
) rsp , rpp , i , y , p ( Y t , n t , n t , n t , n t , n t , n =
t n, ε   is a vector of normally, identically 
distributed disturbances. For each country the number of lags included in the VAR is chosen 
by the Akaike information criterion, considering a maximum lag length of four. 
To study the monetary transmission mechanism, we investigate the responses on the 
different variables to monetary policy shocks.18 To identify the shocks, we use a Choleski 
decomposition, with the variables ordered as above, which is standard in the monetary 
transmission literature (see Christiano et al. 1999). This triangular identification structure 
allows output and the price level to react only with a lag to monetary policy shocks, whereas 
property and equity prices may respond immediately. We thus assume that central banks 
react to current output growth and inflation when setting interest rates, but not to current 
property and equity prices.19  
                                                 
17   Iacoviello (2002) argues that a long-run relation between GDP and real residential property prices 
should exist. 
18   O f  c o u r s e ,  m o n e t a r y  p o l i c y  i s  b e s t  c h a r a c t e r i sed by the central bank’s systematic reactions to 
developments in the variables in the VAR, which are captured by the estimated coefficients. 
However, we are interested in the question of how asset prices react to a change in the interest rate, 
keeping the other variables constant. To address this question, we need to identify monetary policy 
shocks (see Christiano et al. 1999 or Walsh 2003, Chapter 1, for a discussion of these issues). 
19  To identify the monetary policy shock it is sufficient to determine the position in the triangular 
ordering of the monetary policy instrument; the ordering of the variables in the groups before and 
after the interest rate does not matter. 
  8While this last assumption may seem controversial in that few observers would doubt that 
central banks react to changes in asset prices since these influence aggregate demand and 
inflation pressures, barring exceptional circumstances one would not expect any reactions to 
be instantaneous but rather to occur if asset prices rise or fall for some time. By contrast, asset 
prices react immediately to changes in monetary policy. Thus, it seems sensible to attribute 
the contemporaneous correlation between interest rates and asset prices to reactions by the 
latter to the former rather than conversely. We have explored whether the results are 
sensitive to this assumption. Not surprisingly, for equity prices the ordering does matter but 
for residential property prices it does not. However, the alternative assumption that the 
contemporaneous correlation between innovations in interest rates and equity prices is due 
solely to reactions by monetary policy is not only implausible for the reasons mentioned, but 
also leads to counterintuitive results. For instance, equity prices start to increase after a 
contractionary monetary policy shock.20 It therefore seems appropriate to order the interest 
rate before the asset prices in the system.  
Figure 3 shows the bootstrapped impulse responses to a monetary policy shock of 25 basis 
points in the single-country VARs.21 Since these models involve the estimation of a large 
number of parameters, impulse responses are imprecisely estimated. Many analysts 
therefore use plus/minus one standard-error (i.e., 68%) confidence bands. We therefore do so 
too. However, the impulse responses arising from the panel VARs we estimate below are 
more precisely estimated since the data are pooled. To take that into account when 
conducting inference, we use plus/minus two standard-error (i.e., 95%) confidence bands in 
this case. In order to permit comparison with the single country VARs, we show plus/minus 
one and plus/minus two standard-error wide bootstrapped confidence bands in all graphs. 
Given the large number of impulse responses generated by the estimation process, we focus 
on the general features of the results.  
                                                 
20  A rise in equity prices after a contractionary monetary policy shock is inconsistent with results 
obtained with structural identification assumptions relying on the long-run effects of monetary 
policy, see Lastrapes (1998). 
21   The bootstrapped confidence bounds are obtained using the methodology proposed by Sims and 
Zha (1999) and are based on 1000 replications. 
  9As a preliminary, note that the impulse responses are frequently statistically insignificant 
even when the 68% confidence bands are used. After a monetary policy shock the CPI falls, 
though in most countries it takes about 15 to 20 quarters before the maximum effect is felt. 
Nevertheless, in some countries the CPI rises in the short run, indicating the presence of a 
“price puzzle.”22 Because of the wide confidence bands, however, this effect is significant 
only in Australia, Switzerland and the UK. Real GDP declines after a monetary policy shock 
in all countries, and significantly so in about half of them. It is notable that GDP reacts much 
faster than the CPI to a monetary policy shock.  
Of particular interest is the reaction of asset prices. Except for Germany and Spain, 
residential property prices fall in reaction to monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, the 
results appear to differ between countries: the fall of residential property prices is 
significantly different from zero even at the 95% level in Canada, Finland, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the UK and the US. Moreover, while in some countries, 
(including Finland, the UK and the US) residential property prices respond immediately to a 
monetary policy shock, in others, (e.g., Belgium or Spain), the responses are much slower 
and more persistent. However, the confidence bands are wide and it is hard to tell whether 
the responses differ systematically across countries. The reaction of equity prices to 
monetary policy shocks is generally negative and often significant on impact but typically 
becomes insignificant after a few quarters. 
It should be noted, as shown by Figure 3, that the typical path of the interest rate after an 
initial 25 basis-points increase differs widely across countries. One would expect a stronger 
reaction of the variables if the interest rate returns to its initial level slowly or even 
overshoots, as is the case for Australia, than when the reactions of the interest rate are short-
lived, as in France or Ireland.23 Since we are interested in gaining a broad understanding of 
the effects of monetary policy on the economy, we estimate a panel VAR that provides us 
                                                 
22   The price puzzle arises because central banks change interest rates in response to predicted future 
changes in inflation, that is, information that the econometrician does not incorporate in the 
analysis. See Walsh (Chapter 1, 2003) for a discussion. 
23   Furthermore, standard New-Keynesian models imply that the persistence in the reaction of output 
and inflation is higher when monetary policy reacts more strongly to deviations of output from 
baseline. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point. 
  10with the average response of real residential-property and equity prices to typical monetary 
policy shocks. This approach averages the country-specific effects. One reason this is helpful 
is that while the results for the single-country VARs are inconclusive and frequently 
insignificant, we are likely to obtain more precise estimates by exploiting the cross-sectional 
information in the data.  
4. Panel VARs 
There is a large literature on the estimation of panel regressions and the inconsistency that 
can arise in that context. Much of that literature deals with the bias of the fixed-effects 
estimator in dynamic homogeneous panels that results from the inclusion of lagged 
endogenous variables (Holtz-Eakin et al. 1988). This bias is particularly severe if the time 
dimension is small but can be overcome by using GMM or instrumental-variables estimators. 
Since our sample period is rather long, we are not overly concerned about this source of bias. 
Unfortunately, even if the time dimension is large the standard fixed-effects estimator is 
inconsistent in dynamic panels if the coefficients on the lagged endogenous variables differ 
across groups, which is likely in our case as a consequence of divergent financial structures. 
The reason for this inconsistency is that restricting the slope coefficients to be the same across 
groups induces serial correlation in the residuals when the regressors are autocorrelated. 
This serial correlation does not vanish when instrumental variable estimation is applied (see 
Pesaran and Smith 1995). We therefore follow Pesaran and Smith's recommendation and 
estimate the PVAR by the mean group estimator. 24  This estimator assumes that the 
parameters vary cross-sectionally and provides a consistent estimate of the mean effects by 
averaging the coefficients across countries.  
More formally, the panel VAR can be written as  t n t n n n t n Y L A Y , 1 , , ) ( ε μ + + = − , where   is a 
 vector containing the observations for the N countries, n = 1, …  N; μn is a country-
specific intercept and An(L) is a lag polynomial with the VAR coefficients. The disturbances, 
t n Y ,
1 × N
t n, ε , have zero means and a country-specific variance,  . We assume that the coefficients in 
An(L) vary randomly across countries and that the typical element   in  An(L) can be 
2
n σ
p
j , i , n a
                                                 
24   The persistence is indeed greater if the PVAR is estimated by conventional fixed effects. 
Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008b) provide a discussion of this issue. 
  11written as  , where n is the country index, p = 1, …, P, the lag order of the 
VAR and i, j = 1,  … K the number of variables in the VAR. Our interest is in the mean 
parameter value,  . 
p
j , i , n
p
j , i
p
j , i , n a a η + =
p
j , i a
                                                
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses to monetary policy shocks implied by the panel 
regression. Not surprisingly, the large increase in information that comes from using the 
panel approach generates impulse responses that typically are significantly different from 
zero at the 95% level. 
Again, we consider the responses to a 25 basis point increase in the interest rate. After a 
monetary policy shock it takes six quarters before the price level starts to fall, with the effect 
becoming significant only after about two years. This slow response may be a consequence of 
some countries showing a “price puzzle” in their reaction to a monetary policy shock.25 
Furthermore, the results indicate that output falls for about six quarters in response to the 
monetary policy shock before recovering slowly. Residential property prices reach their 
trough somewhat earlier after three quarters but take even longer to recover. By contrast, 
equity prices, which are forward-looking variables, fall immediately following the increase 
in interest rates and have returned to the original level by the time output and property 
prices have returned about half way to their initial levels. 
These findings warrant several comments. First, the reactions of prices and output to the 
shocks are similar to those found in the literature based on single-country studies (see, e.g. 
Christiano et al. (1999) for the US and the VAR studies in Angeloni et al. (2003) for the euro 
area). Second, the responses of residential property prices lead those of real GDP by about 
three quarters. This suggests that changes in property prices influence GDP via their effects 
on wealth and consumption demand. Third, the width of the confidence bands indicates that 
the responses of residential property prices are, statistically, about as well defined as the 
impact on real economic activity. Fourth and most importantly, the point estimate shows 
that after about one year residential property prices have fallen about three times as much as 
the level of real GDP, that is, by 0.375% rather than by 0.125%. Taken at face value, this three-
 
25   While our results do not indicate the presence of a price puzzle, we nevertheless believe that the 
estimates underpredict the impact of monetary policy on the level of prices since we do not include 
indicators or predictors of future inflation in our VAR system. 
  12to-one estimate suggests that while monetary policy could in principle be used to offset 
swings in residential property prices that are seen as causing a threat to financial stability, it 
would induce potentially large swings in real economic activity. For instance, to offset a 15% 
rise in residential property prices, which is not an unusually large increase by the standards 
of many recent property price booms, the central bank must be willing to depress real GDP 
by 5%, a substantial amount.26 Moreover, while the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
equity prices is about as large as the peak effect on residential property prices, the marked 
difference in timing implies that monetary policy cannot easily be used to target both. 
Overall, the results in this section suggest that gearing monetary policy to asset prices is 
likely to generate pronounced swings in economic activity and to stabilise some asset prices 
at the costs of inducing more instability in others. 
5. How important is financial structure? 
One problem with the panel VAR estimates is that they mask any potential heterogeneity 
across the 17 countries in our sample. This is unfortunate since many authors have argued 
that the impact of monetary policy on the economy varies across countries depending on the 
financial structure of the economy (Cecchetti 1999, Ehrmann et al. 2003, Giuliodori 2005). 
Moreover, it is well documented that the financial structure differs significantly between the 
countries we consider (Maclennan et al. 1998; Calza et al. 2007). However, little quantitative 
evidence on the importance of these characteristics has been presented in the literature.27 
One problem with doing so is the nature of the available data. Institutional characteristics 
change little over time, so that time series analysis with such data is precluded. Moreover, 
while there are several characteristics that might influence the effects of monetary policy on 
                                                 
26   See also Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008a). Proponents of using monetary policy to 
mitigate swings in asset prices, such as Borio and Lowe (2002), do not seem concerned by the 
impact of such a policy on economic activity. By contrast, opponents, such as Kohn (2006), 
emphasise the effects on output and inflation. Interestingly, experimental evidence also shows that 
interest rate policy is not effective in dealing with asset price bubbles, see Becker et al. (2007). 
27   An exception is Calza et al. (2007) who compute correlations between the peak effect of a monetary 
policy shock and mortgage market indicators. Of course, there is no lack of cross-country studies 
that find differences in monetary transmission and attribute these to differences in financial 
structure. However, the estimated impulse responses may differ for many other reasons, including 
the conduct of monetary policy and other differences in economic structure that are not taken into 
account. Here we investigate the effect of financial structure more directly.  
  13financial stability, there is no agreement on which characteristics are most important and 
how best to measure these.  
With these caveats in mind, we selected a number of potentially relevant criteria from the 
literature, divided the countries in two groups on the basis of these criteria and estimated a 
panel VAR for each group in order to assess the importance of financial structure.28 We 
emphasise that information on financial structure from different sources are not always 
comparable. One example is the loan-to-valuation (LTV) ratio, where some studies quote the 
maximum, while others refer to the average LTV ratio. In addition, judgement is required 
when grouping countries according to these criteria. Consider, for instance, the classification 
of countries as having fixed or flexible mortgage interest rates. While a majority of mortgages 
with an interest-rate adjustment at three months' notice certainly classifies as flexible, it is 
much more difficult to decide whether interest rates that are fixed between one and five 
years (e.g., Italy; see Calza et al. 2007) should be regarded as fixed or flexible. Any grouping 
of countries is therefore subjective and consequently disputable. 
We deal with this problem in several ways. First, we analyse a broad range of indicators to 
ensure that we capture as many as possible aspects of the structure of mortgage financing. 
Second, for the quantitative characteristics, such as the LTV ratio, mortgage-debt-to-GDP 
ratio and owner-occupation rate, we do not include the value of the criterion as a variable in 
the regression but use a more robust approach by grouping the countries according to 
whether they are above or below the median value of the respective criterion. Our 
classification is thus robust to small changes in the criterion we use. For instance, as long as 
the countries with a high maximum LTV ratio tend to have also an average LTV ratio above 
the median country, our grouping will remain unaffected by whether we chose to rely on the 
maximum or the average LTV ratio. Third, we use the mortgage market index published by 
the IMF (2008) to assess the combined effect of the financial characteristics on the impact of 
monetary policy. One problem with these indices is that they pertain to a specific point in 
time and thus disregard the fact that financial structures tends to evolve over time. However, 
Goodhart and Hofmann (2008) argue that the relative position of countries may change little 
over time. If so, our approach of grouping the countries in two groups and estimating a 
                                                 
28   We let the lag length in the VARs be determined by the AIC. 
  14separate PVAR for each may be robust to changes in financial structure that occurred in our 
sample.  
When interpreting the results, it is important to verify that the use of different criteria is not 
leading to the same allocation of countries to the two groups. We therefore computed the 
correlations between the different criteria and found that they are close to zero.29 With this as 
a preliminary, we turn to a discussion of the seven characteristics in Table 2, their presumed 
influence on the effects of monetary policy shocks and the results in Figure 5 to 12. 
The first criterion we consider is the importance of floating rate financing. It is commonly 
believed that in economies in which mortgage rates are tied to short-term interest rates, 
changes in monetary policy has relatively large effects on residential property prices and 
therefore on the economy, since the interest rates on all loans are reset at the same time. In 
contrast, in the case of fixed rate lending, only new borrowers are affected by changes in 
interest rates.30 It is therefore sometimes argued that fixed-rate mortgages are less risky than 
floating-rate mortgages. However, an unexpected fall in the steady-state inflation rate 
exposes fixed-rate borrowers to an increase in the real interest rate. This effect may have 
been a factor contributing to the fall in residential property prices and the generally weak 
economic performance in the 1990s in Germany and Japan, both of which rely 
predominantly on fixed-rate financing. 
In  Figure 5 we present the results obtained when we distinguish between countries 
depending on the prevalence of fixed- versus variable-rate mortgages. Since the reactions of 
the interest rate and prices did not differ noticeably between any of the country groupings 
and was essentially identical to that plotted in Figure 4, we do not present them. Also the 
CPI reactions were quite similar across country groupings and we do not reproduce it in the 
following figures. As one would expect, the effects of monetary policy on GDP and 
residential property prices are large when variable-rate mortgages are prevalent. 
Surprisingly, the reaction of equity prices to monetary policy is almost twice as large. In 
                                                 
29   The only significant correlation, 0.65, is that between mortgage equity withdrawal and the 
mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. The other correlation coefficients lie between -0.03 and 0.44.  
30   See Maclennan et al. (1998). Calza et al. (2007) present a model which implies that the sensitivity of 
consumption to monetary policy shocks is higher with variable-rate mortgages. 
  15addition the reaction in the fixed-rate group seems to be more persistent, which is 
compatible with the idea that in economies in which fixed-rate financing is important, higher 
short-term interest rates will only over time become embedded in mortgage interest rates 
and therefore impact on GDP and property prices with a delay.   
The second feature we consider is the importance of housing equity withdrawal. If 
households are able to withdraw equity, one would expect them to do so in response to 
rising residential property prices. This would boost consumption spending and aggregate 
demand, and might further increase residential property prices. The process will also work 
in reverse: a tightening of monetary policy that triggers declines in residential property 
prices is likely to have a greater impact on residential property prices and GDP than if 
mortgage equity extraction is not possible.  
Figure 6 shows that the ability to withdraw mortgage equity influences the timing, but less 
so the extent, of the reactions of GDP to monetary policy shocks. In economies where equity 
withdrawal is possible, GDP shows an immediate decline after a monetary policy shock, 
which is less significant and shorter-lived than the GDP decline in the other group. The 
reactions of the other variables to a monetary policy shock are essentially the same.  
A third important characteristic of the financial system is the LTV ratio. A high LTV ratio 
means that households can relatively easily obtain financing to purchase property, 
suggesting that the effects of changes in interest rates are likely to be marked. Furthermore, 
interest rate increases may be more contractionary since households have less equity and 
thus may be more prone to default in conditions of economic hardship. Figure 7 shows that 
the reaction of property prices in the high-LTV group is slightly larger but also that the 
differences between both groups are negligible.  
The fourth characteristic is the mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Since data on the average LTV 
ratio are difficult to obtain and banks presumably apply different criteria to different 
borrowers, the ratio of mortgage debt to GDP provides an alternative measure of the 
responsiveness of the housing market to interest rate changes. Figure 8 shows that real GDP 
falls more quickly and for a longer period in reaction to monetary policy shocks in countries 
with high mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio. Contrary to our expectation, however, the response 
  16of residential property prices is larger in the group with the lower mortgage-debt-to GDP 
ratio.  
The fifth characteristic is the valuation method that is used in different countries. If banks are 
required to value their assets at market prices, monetary policy will have a much stronger 
impact on bank's balance sheets and likely on variables like property prices and GDP 
(Adrian and Shin 2008). Furthermore, as in that case lending decisions will be based on the 
current, as opposed to the historical, valuation level, households’ ability to borrow will be 
more sensitive to current economic conditions and monetary policy. Thus, Tsatsaronis and 
Zhu (2004) hypothesise that residential property prices fall faster in economies in which 
properties are valued using their current market prices. According to Figure 9, however, 
there are no differences in the mean responses of residential property prices and GDP but the 
responses appear more precisely estimated in economies in which properties are valued 
using their current market prices.  
The sixth characteristic we assess is whether it matters if mortgage loans are securitised. 
Tsatsaronis and Zhu (2004) conjecture that the prevalence of securitisation should reduce the 
sensitivity of residential property prices to monetary policy shocks since it allows banks to 
transfer the credit risk associated with mortgages to the capital market. Without 
securitisation the risk of credit crunches would therefore be commensurately larger, 
implying that the effects of monetary policy may be more pronounced in economies in which 
mortgage loans are not securitised. On the other hand, it has been argued that the increased 
reliance on capital markets for mortgage funding associated with securitisation implies 
stronger effects of monetary policy on the economy and on residential property prices (CGFS 
2006). In particular, the subprime crisis has shown that the risk transfer associated with 
securitisation does not seem to function at the economy-wide level and that individual banks 
may underestimate the extent to which shocks are correlated. 
Figure 10 suggests that residential property prices in countries in which securitisation is not 
common fall by more in response to monetary policy shocks than in countries in which 
securitisation plays an important role. This may be because if banks hold mortgages on their 
balance sheets, weak residential property prices impact on their willingness to lend. By 
  17contrast, GDP falls by more in economies where securitisation is frequent; indicating that the 
fall in residential property prices impacts more on the overall economy in these countries.31   
Finally, we consider whether the share of owner-occupied housing matters. With high 
owner-occupancy rates, the wealth effect of monetary policy should be important and one 
would expect a larger impact of monetary policy shocks on GDP (see Maclennan et al. 1998). 
On the other hand, landlords or institutional investors owning rental housing also will 
experience a wealth effect and the argument rests on their wealth effect being smaller than 
that for the owner occupiers. Figure 11 shows that, contrary to our hypothesis, the effect on 
real property prices is smaller if the share of owner-occupied housing is large. This can be 
the case when house owners do not regard their house as a liquid asset, or when the 
possibility of equity withdrawal does not exist. 
Table 3 provides a summary of the results regarding the financial structure. The first column 
lists the criterion which determines the country split. The next six columns give the point 
estimate of the peak effect of monetary policy on GDP, and real residential property and 
equity prices in each of the country groups. The quarter in which this largest effect is 
observed is reported in parentheses. For instance, the first line indicates that in countries 
with variable mortgage rates, GDP tends to fall by 0.05 percent 6 quarters after an interest 
rate increases of 25 bp. With respect to financial structure we find that fixed or variable 
mortgage rates make the largest difference for the effects of monetary policy. By contrast, the 
LTV ratio, the mortgage-to-GDP ratio and the owner-occupancy rate do not seem to be 
important for the transmission of monetary policy. The most pronounced difference in the 
GDP response occurs when the prevalence of securitisation is used as criterion to sort 
countries into two groups. This indicates that, probably in combination with market-
valuation rules, banks' balance sheets play a role in the transmission of monetary policy. Our 
results thus suggests that the findings for the US by Adrian and Shin (2008) may apply in a 
multi-country setting. 
                                                 
31  Adrian and Shin (2008) hypothesise that the combination of securitisation and market valuation 
affects the monetary transmission mechanism. In our setup, we are unable to test this hypothesis 
directly. 
  18While we find a few differences in the transmission of monetary policy depending on the 
financial characteristics, in general financial structure does not seem to matter much for the 
impact of monetary policy on residential property prices and the economy more broadly. 
This may be either because we miss important characteristics that influence the responses to 
monetary policy shocks, such as the structure of the pension and the tax systems, or because 
the indicators used to group countries are poor.32 It may also be that the characteristics of the 
mortgage finance system interact with each other, and that their effect can only be detected 
when they are considered jointly. To explore whether the countries where the criteria 
generally suggest a large impact of monetary policy on residential property prices and 
economic activity indeed show a larger reaction to monetary policy shocks we use the 
mortgage market index calculated by the IMF (2008). This index is supposed to capture the 
degree of mortgage market development and flexibility.33 However, Figure 12 shows that the 
responses of residential property prices to monetary policy shocks do not seem to depend 
significantly on the criteria we investigated. A possible explanation is that some 
characteristics that make residential property prices more sensitive to monetary policy 
typically come together with other characteristics that have a partially offsetting effect. For 
instance, it may be that the ability to take a second mortgage dampens the responses of 
households in economies in which floating rate lending is prevalent. While the reaction of 
residential property prices seems not to depend strongly on the characteristics we 
investigated above, the reaction of equity prices and GDP are indeed larger and more 
persistent in countries in which we expect the monetary transmission mechanism to be 
stronger.  
6. Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the impact of monetary policy stocks on inflation, output and 
asset prices, using VARs and panel VARs estimated on quarterly data spanning 1986 to 2006. 
                                                 
32   This is suggested by the fact that they vary considerably between studies. 
33   Since Switzerland is missing from the IMF study, we construct the index for Switzerland following 
the description in IMF (2008), footnote 3. The resulting index value of 0.26 implies that Switzerland 
is in the country group with less flexible mortgage markets. 
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policy to “lean against” residential property price and stock price booms.  
First, the panel VAR results show that monetary policy has large and predictable effects on 
residential property prices, and that these effects are roughly coincident with its effect on 
real economic activity. More precisely, 25 basis points increase in short-term interest rates 
depresses real GDP by about 0.125%, and real residential property prices by about three 
times as much, or 0.375%, after one or two years.  
While these results suggest that monetary policy could potentially be used to slow down 
property price booms, the estimates imply that substantial interest rate increases would be 
necessary to do so and that these increases would depress real GDP considerably. For 
instance, a 250 basis point increase in interest rates would depress residential property prices 
by about 3.75% and real GDP by about 1.25%. Given that episodes of property price 
upswings have generally been associated with movements in prices of 15-20%, one is led to 
conclude that the cost of using monetary policy to slow down asset-price movements in 
order to reduce threats to financial stability might be large in terms of real output. 
Of course, it is possible that the impact on real property prices might be larger relative to real 
GDP than the three-to-one ratio we estimate here. But even if they are much larger, say five-
to-one, the impact on real economic activity of an attempt to depress residential property 
prices are nevertheless likely to be pronounced.  
Second, the estimates also indicate that monetary policy shocks depress equity prices by 
about as much as they reduce residential property prices. However, equity prices decline 
immediately in this case and have returned to the initial level by the time residential 
property prices reach their through. As a consequence of this difference in timing, it is not 
possible to use monetary to stabilise both residential property and equity prices.   
Third, the individual-country VAR estimates are highly imprecise. This may reflect an 
inherent shortcoming of VAR analysis: with a large number of parameters the estimates are 
necessarily subject to considerable uncertainty. If so, a central bank that is persuaded that 
policy can and should be used to influence asset prices could proceed despite the evidence to 
the contrary. Another interpretation, more plausible to us and compatible with the 
arguments of Kohn (2006), is that the impact of monetary policy on asset prices is in fact 
  20highly uncertain, suggesting that central banks might wish to refrain from attempting to 
steer asset prices. 
Fourth, our panel VAR analysis of the different subgroups of countries indicate that while 
the effects of monetary policy on residential property prices do appear influenced by the 
financial structure, the differences are not large. One caveat, however, is that changes in 
financial structure might have occurred at different points in time in the countries in the two 
groups, blurring the results. It is possible that better data on financial structure may lead us 
to have to revise this conclusion. But it is also possible that such data will lead us to conclude 
that that one aspect of financial structure that seems to increase the economy’s sensitivity to 
monetary policy may be partially offset by another, reducing the overall differences between 
economies.  
Overall, we therefore interpret our results as suggesting that the proponents of using 
monetary policy to lean against asset-price fluctuations in order to ensure financial stability 
may have been too hasty to conclude that this is a sensible strategy.  
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1. Panel unit root tests 
 Level  Difference 
 LLC  IPS  LLC  IPS 
CPI 0.20  0.30  -3.82*  -6.48* 
Real GDP  -0.93  -1.46  -16.25*  -15.55* 
Interest rate  0.36  -0.17  -11.77*  -14.29* 
Real property prices  0.80 1.31  -5.41*  -7.80* 
Real equity prices  -1.24  -1.56  -18.45*  -22.73* 
Note: LLC is the Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) test, IPS the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test. Except for 
the interest rate, where we include a constant only, the tests for the levels include a constant and a 
trend and five lags, whereas the test for the differences include a constant and four lags. The test 
statistics are distributed as N(0,1). * denotes significance at the 5 percent level. 
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0
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6Table 3. Maximum effect of monetary policy shock 
  Large effect expected  Small effect expected 
 GDP  Real 
property 
price  
Real 
equity 
price 
GDP Real 
property 
price  
Real 
equity 
price 
Variable/ fixed 
mortgage rate 
-0.05 
(6) 
-0.22 
(7) 
-1.18 
(1) 
-0.04 
(3) 
-0.15 
(8) 
-0.57 
(1) 
Mortgage equity 
withdrawal 
-0.05 
(4) 
-0.80 
(3) 
-0.58 
(2) 
-0.05 
(6) 
-0.30 
(1) 
-0.82 
(1) 
High/low LTV ratio  -0.04 
(4) 
-0.27 
(2) 
-0.56 
(1) 
-0.06 
(4) 
-0.20 
(2) 
-0.75 
(1) 
High/low mortgage 
debt/GDP ratio 
-0.05 
(3) 
-0.27 
(3) 
-0.43 
(1) 
-0.05 
(4) 
-0.38 
(2) 
-0.72 
(1) 
Market/mortgage 
lending valuation 
-0.04 
(6) 
-0.21 
(3) 
-0.80 
(1) 
-0.06 
(3) 
-0.32 
(4) 
-0.69 
(1) 
Securitisation   -0.07 
(7) 
-0.11 
(6) 
-0.84 
(1) 
-0.03 
(4) 
-0.25 
(3) 
-0.56 
(2) 
High/low owner 
occupancy 
-0.05 
(8) 
-0.13 
(12) 
-0.80 
(1) 
-0.06 
(6) 
-0.34 
(3) 
-0.47 
(4) 
Mortgage market 
index 
-0.04 
(6) 
-0.28 
(6) 
-0.51 
(2) 
-0.03 
(5) 
-0.22 
(1) 
-0.71 
(1) 
The figures in parentheses indicate the quarter in which the maximum effect is attained. 
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 Figure 4. Panel VAR 
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Note: See note to Figure 3. 
 
Figure 5. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage rate 
Variable mortgage rate Fixed mortgage rate
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
  33Figure 6. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage equity withdrawal 
With mortgage equity withdrawal Without mortgage equity withdrawal
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 7. Panel VAR split with respect to loan-to-value ratio 
High LTV ratio Low LTV ratio
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
  34Figure 8. Panel VAR split with respect to mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratio 
High mortgage debt/GDP ratio Low mortgage debt/GDP ratio
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 9. Panel VAR split with respect to valuation method 
Market valuation Mortgage lending valuation
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
  35Figure 10. Panel VAR split with respect to securitisation. 
Securitisation No securitisation
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
Figure 11. Panel VAR split with respect to owner occupancy 
High owner occupancy Low owner occupancy
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Note: See note to Figure 3. The country grouping is indicated in Table 2. 
 
  36Figure 12. Panel VAR split according mortgage market index 
High mortgage market index Low mortgage market index
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Note: See note to Figure 3. Source: World economic outlook (2008), own calculations. Countries in the 
first group include Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, the UK 
and the US; countries in the second group are Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan Spain, 
and Switzerland. 
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